This chapter is excerpted from the book Decision-Makers: Are You Good or Just Lucky? (Available only in French). It provides the foundational framework for structuring a complex decision, enabling you to use the tools introduced in the following chapters at the right time.
When an architect builds a house, he must follow a few basic rules. First, he digs into the ground to lay the foundation. Then he builds the walls, which rest on that foundation. Finally, he installs the roof, supported by the walls. This house then becomes viable and durable — it does not collapse, and we can live in it for a long time.
We propose an analogy between an architect and a paradoxical manager (a complex decision-maker) for pedagogical purposes. Indeed, building a viable and durable decision is similar to constructing a house. You must first lay solid foundations after taking the time to analyze the problem (the root causes), then build the walls by engaging collective intelligence and consulting the various stakeholders, and finally install the roof by making an excellent decision. Since this is a purely pedagogical analogy, you would only waste time and energy by trying to draw overly precise parallels with the actual characteristics of an architect or architecture. We are operating in the field of intellectual architecture through managerial innovation—nothing more!
Watch the ground or experience the ground?
To become a good architect of complex decisions, it is essential to distinguish between watching the ground and working on the ground (experiencing the ground). One does not become an expert simply by reading a book or talking with an expert. Expertise is built over years and lived daily.
When you step down from your ivory tower, from your pyramid, with the wonderful intention of being on the ground, unfortunately, you are automatically perceived by your team as entering performance control mode — even if that is not your intention, even if you simply want to build relationships and contribute to team dynamics. As a result, you only see what others are willing to show you. When you are a chief dealing with a complex issue, you are, by definition, in an ivory tower. You can only step out of that tower with the toolbox of the architect of complex decisions.
To illustrate the difference between watching and experiencing the ground, let’s take the example of Volkswagen — though we could have chosen many other companies, as examples abound! We will show that Volkswagen’s executives failed to distinguish between watching and experiencing the ground. After 20 or 30 years of career within the company, its leaders believed they knew every detail of the organization. One day, they decided to build cars that were truly less polluting. This decision was ambitious but unrealistic for those who had to implement it. It led to Dieselgate, an industrial scandal involving fraudulent use, over seven years from 2009 to 2015, of various techniques designed to reduce emissions from certain diesel and gasoline engines during regulatory testing. The financial impact of this decision was catastrophic: nearly 32 billion euros lost in legal fees and customer compensation. Legal proceedings are still ongoing, so the total cost will continue to rise.
The goal set by the executives was ambitious but unrealistic. However, the information never made its way up to the top of the pyramid for two reasons:
- Career protection: Who wants to step forward and tell the chief that he made a bad decision?
- Hierarchical filters: “The nature of bad news infects the teller.” — Shakespeare
As a result, we can run fast in the wrong direction for months or even years without the information ever reaching the top of the pyramid—whether at the level of a team, a department, or the entire organization. At Volkswagen, the executives received the information after seven years, when they were summoned to court for fraud. That day, they were stunned to discover that the company had not been running fast toward the goal they had set—producing less polluting cars. In reality, Volkswagen had been standing still for seven years!
Making decisions in watch the ground mode not only leads to poor risk management but also infantilizes the team. Making decisions in experience the ground mode, on the other hand, empowers the team — they will come to us with solutions or adjustments long before hitting the wall.
We can imagine that if this happens in Germany, within a prosperous, world-leading company, the same syndrome probably applies to most organizations around the world. The Volkswagen syndrome shows that if a decision is not co-constructed, it will likely be unattainable. Experiencing the ground is possible before making a decision — that is when we can manage our decision risks. After that, everyone will focus on protecting their own career.
When dealing with simple or complicated matters, it is sufficient to watch the ground. Those who watch the ground are the managers — the men and women in operational management, the people on the ground. When dealing with complex matters, however, it is essential to experience the ground. Those who experience the ground are the ones who will execute (operational functions) the future decision and those who will be impacted by it (support functions).
The model of complex decision architecture
The architecture of a decision is a process with several stages. For our engineer friends, it is therefore important to keep in mind that a decision is not really a house! As we mentioned earlier, our approach is purely pedagogical, as we are dealing with intellectual architecture.
The architecture of complex decisions is a six-step model:
- Steps 1 & 2: We lay the FOUNDATIONS by identifying the level of obsolescence of past decisions (see Chapter 1) through an anonymous survey. We must also identify the internal and external stakeholders of the future decision.
- Steps 3 & 4: We build the WALLS on these foundations by combining intelligence and knowledge to make a solution emerge that was in no one’s mind (hybridization). We then secure the decision by anticipating the problems that will arise during the implementation of the future decision. In these two steps, an architect of complex decisions must mobilize those who experience the ground rather than those who watch the ground.
- Step 5: We install the ROOF on the walls by deciding according to the level of responsibility — that is, by applying the principle of subsidiarity.
- Step 6: We move into the house to take action, implementing the decision with operational excellence techniques to move as fast as possible. Our complex decision-maker now becomes the decision-maker of the simple, the complicated-implementation, or the complicated-profession (expert). This step is not part of the architecture of complex decisions, but it is included in the model to show the connections and consequences of each action.
The purpose of this model is to help a decision-maker manage decision risks in collective stakes instead of relying on luck. This does not mean that the decision-maker will achieve 100% success, but he will better control the risks. He will make more durable and more engaging decisions. Achieving 100% success is only possible in simple and complicated situations.
In steps 1 to 5, we aim to determine the direction in which we will run. In the sixth step, we will make marginal adjustments using agility and Lean Management techniques.
What does “Playing with Luck” mean?
A decision-maker plays with luck when he places the roof directly on the ground or on walls built without mortar between the bricks. The house may stand for a while, but it will not be comfortable — there is a risk of disengagement. Soon enough, it may collapse: resignations, difficulties retaining talent, and loss of clients or markets.
We will now see what “playing with luck” means for each of the six steps:
Step 1 – Identifying Obsolescence
Sooner or later, a decision made on a matter of collective stakes will become obsolete. Its obsolescence begins just seconds after it has been made. The speed of that process depends on the organization’s context. At first, obsolescence appears as a weak signal — we simply see smoke. Then, the signal grows stronger, and we start seeing flames: demotivation, loss of productivity, market share erosion, resignations, decreased collective efficiency, and so on.
Identifying obsolescence means conducting a written and anonymous survey on collective stakes at least once a year. This survey helps determine the level of obsolescence of each past decision related to collective stakes. We focus solely on the four types of “blank page.” It is not a social climate survey or a complaint list aimed at earning more and working less.
When analyzing the survey results, the more frequently a topic appears, the greater its level of obsolescence. It is wiser to address the signal before it becomes strong, just as we should address what is important (a collective stake) before it becomes urgent — otherwise, we will no longer have time to co-construct the change. Our path will then lead from the ivory tower to change management.
It is essential to check for holes in the roof, cracks in the walls, or weaknesses in the foundation to determine whether a renovation is needed or if the house should be torn down to build a new one. At present, very few decision-makers identify the level of obsolescence in their decisions. At that point, they trigger the availability bias — addressing only visible information, while obsolescence remains invisible until the house collapses. As a result, what is important is only addressed once it has become urgent. This urgency will push the decision-maker to do part of Step 3 through an emergency meeting with a few available experts and then move directly to Step 5 to act faster. The lifespan of his decision is, therefore, likely to be very short.
We have explained that an architect of complex decisions must adopt a holistic, systemic, and iterative approach. The survey on collective stakes is one of the means to trigger iteration. Certainly, it helps identify new topics, but it also sheds light on the progress or success of the decisions made following previous surveys. If there are very few occurrences, it means that the decision made was relevant — in this case, iteration is unnecessary. However, if occurrences remain, it means that we need another iteration. The iterative approach also applies to the co-construction process (see Step 3 – Combining below), but in that case, it involves micro-iterations — for example, during round-table discussions. Managing collective intelligence is, by nature, an iterative process!
Step 2 – Analyzing
This step consists of conducting an analysis that is:
- Holistic: identifying all stakeholders who are impacted by, or who will impact, the future decision.
- Systemic: assessing current and future interactions among stakeholders to ensure that none are forgotten — particularly those who may be impacted through rebound effects.
With the holistic analysis, we identify those who are directly and immediately impacted. Through the systemic analysis, we add stakeholders who will be impacted indirectly or later on.
This analysis will allow us to distinguish between those who watch the ground and those who experience the ground. The objective is to prepare for Steps 3 and 4, where we will co-construct the change with those who experience the ground, thereby avoiding the ivory tower syndrome.
In other words, we must determine who will live in the house. Today, there is little to no holistic and systemic analysis, because the decision is usually built with the chief and his executive committee — those who watch the ground, those with status, power, degrees, and seniority. In this situation, we risk falling into the Volkswagen syndrome, with walls placed directly on the ground, without foundations.
Step 3 – Combining
We will combine intelligence, knowledge, and experience to generate ideas that we will then hybridize in order to find a balance among all the constraints expressed by every stakeholder — especially those who strongly impact or are strongly impacted by the future decision. This requires using advanced hybridization techniques — the complete opposite of a Post-il wall.
In this step, we design the plans to build the house with those who will live in it. Unfortunately, a manager acting as an expert often lacks listening skills because he wants to prove that he brings the best ideas. He may even shift into a fake participatory mode. Speaking time is not properly distributed between the talkative and the shy, between the young and the experienced — or worse, between men and women! Psychological insecurity causes many participants to remain silent because they fear being humiliated or offended if their idea is not well received. A verbal ping-pong dynamic emerges and encourages ballistic thinking: people shoot down ideas that differ from their own. We listen not to understand, but to respond and tell others they are wrong. The chief speaks first and triggers the authority bias, which leads to flattery behavior.
Ultimately, in a climate of fear, the chief asks: “What do you think?” Sitting across from him are those who watch the ground — his executive committee. The few consultative meetings that follow will lead to a well-known conclusion: the last person to speak to the chief in his office wins the decision! With a bit of professional experience, we understand that it is better to be the last one to speak to the chief before he decides.
Step 4 – Securing
When we speak with decision-makers, they all explain that they have no issues with designing decisions — the problems arise during implementation. This explains the massive use of change management, since implementation often goes poorly because people tend to resist. Is this resistance part of their nature, or is it because the chief’s decision is disconnected from reality? We all know the answer in the minds of some decision-makers: the chief always makes good decisions. Unfortunately, he sometimes has to deal with a team of “broken arms” who resist change on principle.
In the architecture of a complex decision, we do not consider the implementation of a decision to be the problem of those who execute it — it is the problem of the decision-maker. Before deciding in Step 5, an architect therefore simulates the implementation of the decision by conducting an anonymous survey. This allows him to obtain the collective perception of how the future decision will be implemented. The survey is conducted with those who experience the ground, and focuses on the following points, detailed in Chapter 8 of the book Decision-Makers: Are You Good or Just Lucky?:
- Evaluation of the impact and the perceived level of usefulness
- Efforts, resources, and costs required for implementation (procurement, training)
- Efforts, resources, and costs required for ongoing operation (maintenance, updates)
- Time before obtaining the first benefit (one month, one year?)
- Creation or destruction of value for stakeholders
Instead of anticipating the problems that will arise during the implementation of the decision BEFORE deciding — instead of measuring the real value creation of the future decision with all stakeholders — we go directly into change-management mode, that is, at a moment when no one will dare risk his career by criticizing the chief’s decision. Therefore, this must be done beforehand — otherwise, the bricks of the wall will be laid without mortar.
Step 5 – Deciding
The decision must be made according to the principle of subsidiarity. If the decision-maker is solely responsible, he decides alone. If a few people share responsibility, the decision is collegial. Unless we are in a shareholders’ general assembly or in a cooperative, making a collective decision with the team is contrary to the principle of subsidiarity. It is therefore, de facto, a career-management technique that allows a manager to dilute his responsibility into the collective soup. If the decision turns out to be a success, he knows he can take the credit. If it fails, it will no longer be HIS decision but THEIR decision. No organization uses the technique of collective punishment. Choosing the collective decision is always a win for the manager: he can claim success if things go well, or place the blame on others if things go wrong.
When delegations of authority are not clear within an organization, we immediately leave the field of management and enter the field of career management. If necessary, it is therefore fundamental to work on subsidiarity by clarifying responsibilities long before reaching Step 5. The word fundamental is emphasized because unclear responsibilities will create enormous problems in every step of the architecture of a complex decision.
There is no point in starting the six steps if no one can answer this question: “Who is the final decision-maker?”
Making a collective decision to better dissolve one’s responsibility consists of seeking consensus. On a simple or complicated matter, this may have value — even if the final decision is made alone. However, this approach becomes absurd when dealing with a topic on which no one knows with certainty, and it will take 6 to 12 months to find out whether the decision was good or bad. In a complex situation, everyone has an opinion and expresses it with great confidence — but no one is willing to bet their salary on any particular solution. The very nature of a complex situation is unpredictability and uncertainty.
When a chief proposes a solution at the end of a meeting — his solution with a few amendments — and then turns to the participants and asks: “What do you think?” he believes he is obtaining a consensus. But he has just activated the groupthink cognitive bias. This bias keeps us from making waves out of fear of displeasing others. This behavior is even easier to adopt when no one knows with certainty. And since the chief appears so confident, he must surely be right. In reality, he simply wants to maintain his legitimacy as an expert — and what he believes is consensus is actually pseudo-consensus. This gives the chief a false sense of security. He tells himself that his decision cannot be wrong, since everyone agrees. He forgets to ask how that “agreement” was obtained: Did he speak last? Was speaking time truly distributed? Were participants afraid to talk? Did he engage in ballistic thinking? All these questions reveal whether there was actual agreement — or simply silence dressed up as consent.
Thus, many collective decisions are the result of groupthink bias, which produces a pseudo-consensus. The decision-maker risks placing the roof on a fragile wall, itself resting on the ground with no foundation. The speed of decision obsolescence will be proportional to the number of steps that were skipped or poorly executed.
Step 6 – Acting
The final step is the implementation of the decision. Thanks to the five previous steps, we should now be running in the right direction. It is time to run as fast as possible using all the Lean Management and productivity techniques that managers fully master.
This is not easy, but throughout this article, we must remember that we are dealing exclusively with complex subjects. There is not just one kind of decision-making excellence — there are three: excellence in the simple, the complicated, and the complex. Our architect focuses solely on decision-making excellence related to collective stakes.
People say we should think before acting — meaning: lay the foundation, build the walls on that foundation, and then install the roof on the walls. Unfortunately, in most organizations, Step 4 — securing — is done during Step 6 through change management. Human factors are addressed far too late. At that point, no one will dare tell the chief that he has made a mistake. In summary, this Step 6 of change management consists of finding allies and “neutralizing” opponents — whereas an architect of complex decisions does not manage change. He co-constructs it in Steps 3 and 4 — combining and then securing.
If the decision-maker ultimately turns out to have been unlucky, change management will push employees to run as fast as possible in the wrong direction, because the essence of change management is to implement a decision — not to challenge it by knocking on the chief’s door to deliver bad news.
To conclude this article, making a decision on a complex subject follows a six-step model, in which the actual design of the decision takes place in only one step — Step 3. It is the critical point of the process, yet it is only one of the steps.
The faster we decide on complex matters, the more often we risk having to decide again! Playing with luck means making a decision in only three steps: 3 + 5 + 6.
This process risks creating an ivory tower — walls with no mortar and no foundations. How can we make well-informed decisions at the top of an ivory tower with those who watch the ground?
We cannot make well-informed decisions in complex situations using current management methods — but with managerial innovation. It requires doing the exact opposite of what we have been doing since the beginning of our careers!
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